📸 Emmanuel Dunand / AFP
While the nuclear negotiations with Iran appear to evolve in a positive direction, Israeli leaders become anxious and try to put up the last efforts to prevent the signing of a new nuclear agreement between the P5+1 group (the US, Russia, the UK, France, China, and Germany) and Iran. After several concessions made by Tehran, including dropping the demand to remove the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) designation as a foreign terrorist organization, the EU's chief negotiator Enrique Mora sent to Washington a draft agreement agreed upon by all the other parties. In the meantime, the Israeli leaders issued several inflammatory statements regarding negotiations with Iran and the prospect of a new deal.
Israel's Prime Minister Yair Lapid said that what we have now on the table is "a bad deal," adding that its embrace would bring Iran $100 billion annually that will only be spent on undermining the stability in the Middle East and spreading terror in the world. Moreover, Defense Minister Benny Gantz stated that Israel would do whatever it needed to prevent the signing of a new deal with Iran. During an official visit to Washington this week, Gantz emphasized the necessity of maintaining a viable military option even after a new agreement is concluded, adding during a meeting with the US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan that Israel maintains its "operational freedom" with or without an accord.
In all this discussion regarding Israel's position toward a new nuclear deal with Iran, one crucial question remains why the Israeli leaders are so against a diplomatic solution to the issue of Tehran's nuclear program? There are at least two main reasons that need to be taken into consideration. First is the concern of Israeli political and military decision-makers that a nuclear Iran would represent an existential threat to the Jewish state. However, developing atomic weapons does not necessarily imply using them.
As such, the debate divides the Israeli political landscape into two camps: one formed by those who believe that the likelihood of a nuclear attack against Israel is high once Iran develops weapons of mass destruction and those that see the possibility of such an action as low or lower. For the first category, Iran must be treated as an existential threat, and Israel must do everything possible to prevent Tehran from acquiring nuclear capabilities. For those in the second category, Israel must do everything rational to stop the Islamic Republic from developing nuclear weapons. The nuclear posture of a country should be understood in operational terms, not declarative. Thus, despite Iran's rhetoric regarding the destruction of Israel, the question is whether its leaders will use their nuclear capabilities or not. If we consider Tehran a rational actor, as previously proved, probably not, due to a simple costs-benefits analysis showing that such an action will draw extreme consequences.
Secondly, one of Israel's fundamental fears regarding a nuclear Iran is that this will significantly shift the regional balance of power. Moreover, the United States has become less involved in the region compared to the past. In addition, several Gulf states, such as the UAE, with which Israel normalized relations, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait put significant efforts into improving their ties with Tehran. In these circumstances, Israel feels the danger of being abandoned when Iran has become more powerful. This phenomenon occurs when the number and reliability of a state's allies drop significantly, a situation that may lead to a re-evaluation of the state's position on regional issues. In Israel's case, the fear of abandonment appeared during the Obama administration when the US president's relations with Benjamin Netanyahu witnessed tense periods due to the former's push to halt the expansion of Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank, among others. The feeling disappeared during Trump's presidency after the US made considerable concessions to Israel but appears to return in the current situation.
To attack or to not attack? This is the question. Although several analysts argue that the option of military action against Iran is no longer viable due to Tehran's development of conventional weapons, in reality, the scenario among Israeli decision-makers remains on the table. Intelligence services most probably penetrate Iran and the locations of its most important nuclear facilities are known. Currently, Israel limits itself to conducting covert operations, such as sabotage or the assassination of scientists involved in the atomic program and IRGC high-rank officials.
The Israeli air forces are, for now, unable to launch a massive military attack against Iran. Such an operation would imply flying above hostile territories, mid-air refueling, avoiding Iran's air-defense systems, destroying the targets, and returning to Israel. There are at least two phases that are currently impossible. First, Israel does not have the mid-air refueling capabilities for its fighting jets, and the US made it very clear that it will not back the Israeli air forces during an attack on Iran. Second, many Iranian nuclear facilities are buried deep under the ground and Washington refused to sell Israel advanced bunker-buster bombs. Moreover, Iran has already acquired the necessary knowledge to build nuclear weapons, which means that striking some equipment will buy Israel some time, but its purpose is unclear.
A diplomatic solution to the issue of Iran's nuclear program remains the best option for Israel and the world. However, the position and rhetoric of Israeli leaders remain the same. The "Octopus Doctrine," where Iran is the head and the tentacles that must be cut off are the militias Tehran backs in countries such as Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria, is as present as it was at the time formulated by the former prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Defense Minister Benny Gantz said during Netanyahu: Iran is an existential threat that must be dealt with accordingly and that its ambitions are the most significant danger to regional and international stability and security. Yair Lapid states today from the position of the prime minister the same he said as foreign minister: that lifting the economic sanctions imposed on Iran would only finance terrorism and endanger the stability in the Middle East. The Israeli discourse's consistency is that all the leaders want "a good deal," not "a bad deal." Beyond the vagueness of these syntagms, it is not clear what "a good deal" means for Israel, but probably a series of unacceptable demands for Iran and the Western allies.
After the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was signed, despite Benjamin Netanyahu's and his allies' harsh opposition, the Israeli leaders quietly embraced the accord, maintaining their aggressive rhetoric. The same thing is expected to happen this time, given that the Biden administration is unlikely to support an Israeli massive military operation against Tehran. Nonetheless, Israel's army is highly influential and involved in the political decision-making and its vision, just as in the case of Hamas in the Gaza Strip, is that even limited military campaigns have the potential to buy time, although unclear what for. Thus, the Israeli leaders' current position regarding Iran's nuclear program is almost identical to those expressed during Benjamin Netanyahu's tenure as prime minister.